The Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT) has wrongly declared that Trinity Western University (TWU) violates academic freedom because of its Christ-centered character.

CAUT bases its conclusion upon two facts.  First, TWU draws its faculty and staff from among those who voluntarily embrace its Statement of Faith.

Second, TWU “rejects as incompatible with human nature and revelational theism a definition of academic freedom which arbitrarily and exclusively requires pluralism without commitment, denies the existence of any fixed points of reference, maximizes the quest for truth to the extent of assuming it is never knowable, and implies an absolute freedom from moral and religious responsibility to its community.”  Accordingly, TWU “is committed to academic freedom in teaching and investigation from a stated perspective, i.e., within parameters consistent with the confessional basis of the constituency to which the University is responsible, but practised in an environment of free inquiry and discussion and of encouragement to integrity in research.”

CAUT has put TWU on a list of schools it says do not respect academic freedom and is investigating other Christ-centered universities in Canada, including Crandall University and Canadian Mennonite University.

CAUT acknowledges that TWU is a legitimate institution of higher education with qualified scholars.  It nonetheless has essentially deemed Christ-centered higher education to be pedagogically illegitimate.  This is a remarkable departure from precedent.  Many similar institutions have operated in the United States and Canada for many years with their distinctive conception of academic freedom.  The higher education establishment has accommodated and accepted the distinctive nature of such institutions, respecting their legitimate place in the tapesty of North American higher education.

I suspect that simple disagreement with (and probably even animosity towards) TWU’s religious commitments has motivated this unfortunate departure from the respect that the world of higher education has generally afforded Christ-centered higher education.  The notion that God is the source of truth and that He has revealed truth in Scripture is foolish and offensive to most university professors, who believe that the exclusive means for discovering truth is through empirical observation or rational deduction.  A disagreement over epistomology is hardly a reason to deem schools like TWU to be illegitimate. Yet this is precisely what CAUT has done.

JTA, which describes itself as “The Global News Service of the Jewish People,” has posted an article discussing the divergent choices various Jewish groups have made regarding Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.  As the article explains, some groups have filed “friend of the Court” briefs supporting CLS’s constitutional freedom to draw its officers and voting members from among those who share its religious commitments — both doctrinal and moral.  Others plan to file in support of the government or sit the case out.

The article features several remarkable statements by Deborah Lauter, the National Director of Civil Rights for the Anti-Defamation League.  First, she implicitly characterizes CLS as a group that is “opposed” to non-Christians and those who engage in extramarital sexual conduct.  It is profoundly unfair and misleading to characterize CLS’s statement of faith requirement as “opposition” to those who have different religious commitments.  The statement of faith expresses CLS’s core religious beliefs, positively articulating what brings its members together.  The idea that the founders and leaders of CLS started with some “opposition” to non-Christians and then wrote the statement of faith to express that alleged “opposition” is absurd.

Second, Ms. Lauter suggests that if CLS prevails, public universities will be rendered utterly unable to address actual invidious discrimination.  I continue to find it amusing that opponents of CLS’s position, finding themselves unable to mount a persuasive case against CLS itself, must resort to parades of hypothetical horribles.  Her remark reflects a conflation of real discrimination (invidiously taking irrelevant characteristics into account) and the means by which a bona fide religious group legitimately maintains its religious character over time.

Third, Ms. Lauter said that it is “antithetical to democracy” to allow religious groups that consider religion in their hiring decisions to participate in federally funded social service programs.  “Democracy” produced the 1996 welfare reform law, which acknowledged the right of such religious groups to participate in the provision of services to needy people with public money.  Large numbers of both Democrats and Republicans voted for this legislation, and a Democratic president (Bill Clinton) signed it.  Can one plausibly call their handiwork “antithetical to democracy”?  It appears as though “antithetical to democracy” means “stuff ADL doesn’t like.”

Hastings states that no group can deny voting membership and leadership to any student on any basis (not just on the basis of characteristics listed in Hastings’ Policy on Nondiscrimination, like race and religion).  Under such a policy, a student chapter of ADL would not be able to withhold voting membership or an officer position from an avowed anti-Semite.  Does ADL really believe that Hastings would not violate ADL’s constitutional rights by revoking its registered status under such circumstances?  Perhaps ADL is confident that Hastings would selectively enforce such a policy by, say, withholding registered student organization status from CLS while conferring such status on it.  That might not be an unreasonable assumption:  in 2004, Hastings conferred RSO status upon La Raza (“the race”) even though its bylaws expressly limited membership and leadership to those “of Raza background.”

CLS v. Martinez Debate - ADF Attorney Greg Baylor, Professor Maureen Armour , Professor Linda Eads

Earlier this week, I participated in a debate regarding Christian Legal Society v. Martinez at Southern Methodist University’s Dedman School of Law in Dallas.  I argued that the U.S. Supreme Court should rule that Hastings College of the Law violated the Constitution when it refused to recognize its CLS chapter because the chapter draws its officers and voting members from among those who share its religious commitments.  SMU law professor Linda Eads energetically but graciously advocated a contrary result.

In my prepared remarks, I shared my belief that Hastings’ disagreement with CLS’s counter-cultural positions on religious doctrine and sexual morality was at least in part behind the school’s treatment of the CLS chapter.  Professor Eads essentially agreed with me, but then said something that truly surprised me – that Hastings should have the power to punish a counter-cultural group like CLS in order to promote “the culture it wants to foster.”

As I see it, a private educational institution, such a religious one, does have (and should have) the power to foster a certain kind of culture, free from the restraints the Constitution imposes upon government educational institutions.  But the First Amendment forbids the government from using its power to restrain the expressive activity of a group whose views contradict the government’s simply because of that disagreement.

My experience has been that many public university administrators fail to adequately grasp that the Constitution limits their power – something their  private school counterparts do not experience.  A greater understanding of this reality by America’s public colleges and universities would go a long way towards restoring freedom of speech on those campuses.

The battle over Christian Legal Society v. Martinez continues to rage. Eugene Volokh responds to David French, ADF Senior Legal Counsel.

By treating this case as a “government benefits” case, I think Eugene is missing a few vital things. First, let’s not forget that this case arises in a university setting, where a very long line of case law holds — among other things — that the university is “peculiarly a marketplace of ideas” that if closed will cause our culture to “stagnate and die.”

Click to read counter response by David French to Eugene Volokh.

Speak Up University – Protect and Promote Religious Rights at our Public Universities.

Recently, Robert O’Neil commented in the Chronicle of Higher Education about the growing conflict between university anti-discrimination policies and the First Amendment rights of campus student groups to select their members according to the groups’ core religious beliefs. To his credit, Mr. O’Neil clearly grasps the critical importance of this issue. His commentary provides a detailed, thoughtful discussion of the current state of the matter in the federal court system and his call for clarification from the Supreme Court is well-taken.

Unfortunately though, Mr. O’Neil’s commentary concludes by providing a “how to” guide showing universities how they can apply their anti-discrimination laws to exclude religious groups from campus without violating the Constitution. While his suggestions that such policies be “clear” and administered “evenhanded[ly]” are not inherently problematic, his other proposals smack of a disdain for religious organizations that would not be tolerated if applied to other student organizations.

For example, Mr. O’Neil suggests that universities sanction student groups for the act of “refusing to sign . . . a nondiscrimination policy” rather than the “stated views of the organization” because conduct is less protected than speech. Under this formulation, student groups could hold to any religious beliefs they wanted . . . .as long as they signed away their right to act on those beliefs in the future. This proposal would render the students’ beliefs meaningless.

Similarly, Mr. O’Neil proposes that public universities utilize “creative thinking” by requiring religious groups to “acknowledge” the nondiscrimination policy, but only sanctioning them if and when an aggrieved student files a charge of discrimination. Again, such an arrangement provides no protection for the student groups whatsoever.

These and other of Mr. O’Neil’s proposals offer little in the way of real compromise. His implicit premise is clear: Universities and student organizations can get along if the student groups will forfeit any religious beliefs that do not comport with the university’s concept of “tolerance.” And by offering all the ways universities can implement their policies just shy of violating the constitution, Mr. O’Neil betrays an implicit—and sadly prevalent—bias against religious student organizations. Indeed, would Mr. O’Neil also advise universities how close they can come to the line of sexual harassment, racial discrimination, or sexual orientation discrimination? I think the answer is obvious.

As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, public universities—like all government entities—need to give private organizations a wide berth for the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, rather than looking for ways to encroach as far as the Constitution will technically permit. Hopefully, university administrators will take this principle to heart, rather than skate on the constitutional thin ice provided by Mr. O’Neil. But the Supreme Court now has the chance to reaffirm this principle definitively as today it agreed to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision against the Christian Legal Society. May the First Amendment win.